B i and branching networks are two classes of minimal networks often found in the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks. Why so? In this paper, we answer this question by establishing a generalized condition that holds together several models in the literature, and then show that this condition is sufficient to guarantee their common result: every non-empty component of minimal Strict Nash network is either a branching or B i network. This paper, therefore, contributes to the literature of two-way flow Strict Nash networks by merging together several existing works.
Introduction
The literature of two-way flow information network originates from the seminal work of Bala and Goyal (2000) , whose model possesses the following features: (i) each agent possesses a piece of nonrival information that he does not mind sharing with others; (ii) an agent forms a link with another agent by simply bearing the link establishment cost c > 0, which is assumed to be identical among all agents, 1 (iii) once a link is established, two agents -one paying for the link formation cost and the other not paying share information with each other (hence the term 'two-way' flow) 2 ; (iv) through a series of links, information of two agents can also be shared; (v) as information traverses via links, information decay may be present; and (vi) the degree of information decay is linkwise and assumed to be identical across all links. For the sake of prediction, Bala and Goyal (2000) use strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies to study static properties. These equilibrium networks are called strict Nash networks (SNNs). Naturally, due to these simplified assumptions Bala and Goyal (2000) find that SNNs also have rather simplified shapes, which are either center-sponsored star or empty network.
Consequently these simplifications have inspired a vast literature that questions how an incorporation of more realistic assumptions would alter or lead to a larger class of networks that are strict Nash. Within such a vast literature, interestingly many models predict that strict Nash networks consists of minimal non-empty components that are either B i or branching network (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 ). Another surprising observation is that this result emerges from two strands of models whose assumptions do contrast with each other. Specifically, this result is seen in models that assume the presence of small information decay without agent heterogeneity in link formation cost, as well as models that assume absence of information decay yet with the presence of agent heterogeneity in link formation cost. Why is this the case? This paper seeks to answer this question. 3
Figure 2: Three branching networks rooted at i * . Observe that i * is the only agent that receives no links. Observe further that the middle network is a center-sponsored star, which is the only form of non-empty component of SNNs in Proposition 4.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) and Proposition 3.2 of Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) . Adapted from Charoensook, Banchongsan. 2015 . "On the Interaction between Player Heterogeneity and Partner Heterogeneity in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks." Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics 25, no. 3: 22. We systematically classify the related literature here. Generally speaking, there are two strands of two-way flow models that predict that SNNs consist of minimal non-empty components that are either B i or branching networks. As mentioned above, one strand assumes the presence of small information decay without agent heterogeneity in link formation cost. 4 These models are those of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and Bala and Goyal (2000) . Worth mentioning is that the results of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) generalize those of Bala and Goyal (2000) in the sense that De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) assume a more general payoff. In addition, Proposition 1 of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) gives a fine-detail characterization of SNN while Proposition 5.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) only gives a partial characterization. The other strand assumes the absence of information decay with the presence of agent heterogeneity in link formation cost. These models are those of Charoensook (2015) , Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) , and Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) . A major difference among these models is on how agent heterogeneity in link formation cost is assumed. Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) assume that link formation cost depends exclusively on the identity of agent who establishes links (link sender), while Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) assume that link formation cost depends exclusively on the identity of agent who receives the links (link receiver). These two models -Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) and Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) -as well as the original model of Bala and Goyal (2000) that assumes no heterogeneity and no decay are generalized by Charoensook (2015) , which allows the heterogeneity in link formation cost to depend on both identity of link sender and link receiver under a restriction known as Uniform Partner Ranking. See Table 1 . Beside the models in Table 1 that this paper aims to merge, a closely related paper is that of Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2012) since they also study the relation between information decay and heterogeneity. However, their focus is quite different in the following ways. First, they focus on the role of heterogeneity in terms of value of information and decay rather than the role of heterogeneity in link formation cost and homogeneity in information decay as in this paper. Second, we study the effects of information decay and heterogeneity in link formation cost in isolation of each other on properties of SNNs, while Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2012) study the interaction of these two on the existence/nonexistence of Nash networks. Hence, this paper can be considered as a complement to Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2012) in the sense that one explores aspects pertaining to existence/nonexistence of equilibrium networks, while the other (our paper) explores aspects pertained to shapes of equilibrium networks. Considering such a vast array of literature that gives rise to the result that minimal SNN consists of components that are either B i or branching, this paper contributes to the literature by (i) identifying a unique condition that holds together this common result, and (ii) utilizing this condition to gain insights as to why this common result arises. This condition is called Partially Consistent Partner Preference condition (PCPP). This condition rests upon three definitions introduced in this paper, which we now elaborate. First, we define the term viewpoint of i as a subnetwork disconnected from i under a fictitious presupposition that a link between i and j, whether the link is sponsored by i or j does not matter, is removed. Next, based upon this concept of viewpoint we pick up any two agents j and k contained in the same viewpoint and ask 'if i were to establish a link either with j or k, which agent would give i a higher payoff?' This is how we define the preference of i over agent j and k. Naturally, if j gives a higher payoff (at least the same payoff) to i than k does, we say that i strictly (weakly) prefers j to k. Third, we define a chain between i and i' as a series of undirected links whose two ends are i and i', where the term undirected refers to the fact that the identity of link sponsorship does not matter.
Based upon these three definitions let us assume that we pick up any chain with at least four agents. Let the sequence of agents in this chain be i, j, ..., j', i'. Our PCPP condition says that either: (i) if i prefers j to j' then i' also agrees that j is preferred to j', or (ii) if i' prefers j' to j then i also agrees that j' is preferred to j, hence the term 'consistent' partner preference. Note that this consistent partner preference is also 'partial' in the sense that except the agents j and j' PCPP does not impose the preferences of i and i' towards any other agents, hence the term Partially Consistent Partner Preference. Very interestingly, for every existing two-way flow model in Table  1 , PCPP condition holds in any minimal networks, be they SNN or not. Then based upon this PCPP condition, we show that PCPP is indeed a sufficient condition for every non-empty component of minimal SNN to be either B i or branching. These two findings-PCPP being a sufficient condition and PCPP being satisifed by all models in Table 1 -are established as Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 in this paper respectively.
Considering that PCPP holds in both models that assume agent heterogeneity in link formation cost with no decay and models that assume decay with no heterogeneity in link formation cost, we provide an insight as to why this commonality arises. First, concerning the role of information decay it is important to keep in mind that while homogeneity is assumed, in the sense that every link in a network has the same level of decay, a form of agent heterogeneity emerges. Specifically agents become heterogeneous in terms of informational quantity that they obtain in the network. 5 Indeed, some agents will receive more information than others because their locations measured by distances from other agents in the network allow for less information decay compared to the positions of other agents. Naturally, these agents who are relatively 'better informed' than other agents are preferred as potential partners since they provide more informational benefits to whoever chooses to establish a link with them.
Consequently, the role of information decay is rather similar to the role of agent heterogeneity in the sense that among two potential partners with which an agent wishes to form a link, one potential partner is likely to provide a higher payoff than the other. This intuition is formalized as partner preference in this paper. While it is natural to expect for agents to have different partner preferences, what this paper discovers is that a similar pattern of partner preference emerges in all models included in Table 1 . Essentially we formalize this consistency in terms of partner preference of agents as Partially Consistent Partner Preference condition that we previously mentioned. This PCPP condition further allows us to answer why these models share the same result that every minimal SNN consists of non-empty component that is either B i or branching. This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we introduce the model of two-way flow networks and payoffs that are general enough to cover all models in the related literature. Then we introduce the concepts of viewpoint, partner preference, and PCPP condition. Subsequently we introduce useful lemmata and main propositions. Next, we provide two discussion sections. One proposes models extended from existing literature that also satisfy PCPP, hence illustrating the usefulness of PCPP in predicting patterns of SNNs. The other section illustrate a few models that do not satisfy PCPP condition but still have the result that every component of minimal SNN is either B i or branching, which illustrates that PCPP condition is a sufficient but not necessary condition that guarantees this result. Finally we end this paper with a few concluding remarks.
The Model
Strategy of each agent Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. Consider an agent i ∈ N . For each agent j ∈ N\{ i}, i chooses whether to form a costly link without j's consent. Let = 1 indicate that i forms a link with j and = 0 otherwise. If = 1 we say that i access j. Let ≡ { } ≠ be a strategy of i. Naturally, a collection of strategies of all agents is a strategy profile, which is defined as = { } ∈ . Due to the fact that link formation is unilateral, all links and agents -whether they have links with each other or no -constitute the network. Consequently g represents both a strategy profile and a network.
Network connectivity and information flow Consider an agent i in a network g. i can retrieve information of another agent j whenever there is a link or a series of links between i and j, whether i or j sponsors the link does not matter (hence the term 'two-way' flow). Thus, we writē= 1 to indicate that = 1 or = 1, and = 0 to indicate otherwise. If̄= 1 then i is said to be an adjacent agent of j and vice versa. The set of all these links is denoted by.
A series of links between agents i and j through which information flows from i to j (and vice versa) is called chain. In more formal terms, a chain between i and j is a sequence of agents 0 , 1 , ..., such that 0 = , = and̄,
+1
= 1 for l = 0 to = − 1. A path from i to j is defined in the same manner as a chain except that , +1 = 1 replaces̄, +1 = 1. Network-related notations A network is said to be minimal if there is at most one chain between two agents in the network. A network is connected if there is at least one chain between any two agents in the network. That is, any pair of agents in this network can observe and hence obtain information of one another. Of course, a network is minimally connected if there is exactly one chain between any two agents in the network.
A network 1 is a subnetwork of network 2 if 1 ⊆ 2 . Let ( ) be the set of all agents in a network g. A subnetwork 1 is said to be a component of 2 if there is a chain between any pairs of agents i and j such that , ∈ ( 1 ) and no chain between any pairs of agents i, j such that ∈ ( 1 ) and ∉ ( 1 ). An agent who receives links but establishes no link is called a terminal agent. Next, we introduce some patterns of networks used in this paper. Before so doing we introduce the following notations. Consider a minimally connected network g, let ( ) denotes the set of agents that i receives links from and ( ) denotes the set of agents that i establishes links with. A network such that there is exactly one agent i such that | ( ) | = 0 and | ( ) | = 1 for every j ∈ N\{i} is called a branching network rooted at i. Figure  2 illustrates several forms of branching networks. Note that there exists a path from i to every other agent in the network. Note further that a center-sponsored star as seen in Figure 2 , which is the only non-empty SNN in the Proposition 4.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) , is also a branching network.
Next, we introduce another form of network called network. This form of network is first introduced in the context of Graph Theory in Harary, Norman, and Cartwright (1965) , and then studied in the context of Strict Nash Network by Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) whose the following definition is borrowed from. Specifically, Let N' ⊂ N. We set ′ ( ) = ′ ∪ { ∈ | there exists a path from i ∈ N' to j}. That is, ′ ( ) consists of N' and all agents that can be reached via a path from an agent in N'. A point contrabasis of a network g, ( ), is a minimal set (for the inclusion relation ⊂) of players such that ( ) = . An i-point contrabasis, ( ), is a point contrabasis of g such that every ∈ ( ) accesses i. A network g is a -network if it satisfies the following properties: | ( ) | ≥ 2, | ( ) | < 2 for all j ≠ i, and ( ) = ( ). Figure 1 shows several forms of network. Specifically all three networks are * networks such that -from left to right - * ( ) consists of { 1 , 2 }, { 1 , 2 , 3 } and { 1 , 2 } respectively. Note that a periphery-sponsored star is also a network. Finally, if a network is such that ( ) = ( ) = 0 for every i ∈ N, then the network is said to be an empty network. Viewpoint and Anti-viewpoint In a minimally connected network or a minimal component, a removal of the link between i and j (whether i or j sponsors the link does not matter) splits the component into two -one containing i and the other containing j. The split component that contains j, denoted by ( −) is called the viewpoint of i via j or a viewpoint of i for short. Conversely, the split component that contains i, denoted by ( −) is called the anti-viewpoint of i via j or an anti-viewpoint of i for short. Modified Networks Now let us consider two components of a network g, say 1 and 2 . Let agent i and j belong to 1 and 2 respectively. If i establishes a link with j, then 1 and 2 become connected. We denote this connected component by 1 ∪ 2 . In the same manner, the viewpoint and anti-viewpoint of i can also be jointed. Specifically suppose an agent k is in ( −), we call ( −) ⊕ ( −) a modified network by i via ik or a modified network via ik for short.
Decay and Distance In some models, including De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and Section 5.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000), a homogeneous and geometric link-wise decay is present. Specifically, let σ ∈ [0,1] denote the 'decay factor.' This decay is linkwise and geometric in the sense that for each link that the information traverses a part (1 − ) of information is lost and a part σ of information remains. Specifically, let , be the value of the piece of information possessed by player j for player i. 6 If the information flows to i directly through a link, the information of j that i receives is , , In general, if the information flows to i through a −link −chain, the information of j that i receives is , . Note that this decay is homogeneous in the sense that the same σ is applied to all links, regardless of the identity of link receiver and link sender. Therefore, if there is more than one chain between two agents, the chain that consists of the smallest amount of links yields the highest ex-post information. The original model of Bala and Goyal (2000) and several works in this literature assume that information is exchanged through the shortest chain.
The assumption that information is exchanged through the shortest chain further results in the fact that an agent i has an incentive to establish a link in order to construct a shorter chain with j even if there exists another ij-chain in the network. However, if the decay factor σ is sufficiently small, the benefits from doing so cannot cover the additional link establishment cost. Consequently such an incentive disappears and there is at most one chain between any two agents in the network. Throughout De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and Section 5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000) , this assumption of sufficiently small decay is assumed.
Link Formation Costs Let
> 0 be the link formation cost that agent i bears whenever he establishes a link with agent j, j ≠ i. If = for all i, j such that i ≠ j, the model is said to assume agent homogeneity in link formation cost. Naturally if there are two distinct pairs of agents ij and i'j' such that ≠ ′ ′ then the model is said to assume agent heterogeneity in link formation cost. Now let us define = { } ≠ as the cost structure of a network. If = for every ∈ , then the two-way flow model is said to assume player heterogeneity in link formation cost in the sense that depends only on the identity of the player. We remark that player heterogeneity in link formation is assumed in the model of Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) . Conversely if = for every ∈ , then the two-way flow model is said to assume partner heterogeneity in link formation cost in the sense that depends solely on the identity of the partner. This assumption is used in Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) .
Next, we introduce a restriction on that is more general than player heterogeneity and partner heterogeneity. Specifically consider a set X ⊆ N and agents j, k ∈ X, j is at least as good a partner as k with respect to the set X if ≤ for any i ∈ X, i ≠ j ≠ k. Moreover, if the inequality is strict then j is said to be a better partner than k with respect to the set X. If X = N and for any distinct pair j, k ∈ N it holds true that j is at least as good a partner as k or k is at least as good a partner as j with respect to the set N then is said to satisfy Uniform Partner Ranking condition. We remark that this UPR condition was introduced by Charoensook (2015) . Note that if assumes player heterogeneity, also satisfies UPR condition since = = so that j is at least as good a partner as k and k is at least as good a partner as j. For the same reason if assumes agent homogeneity as in Bala and Goyal (2000) UPR is also satisfied. Note further that if assumes partner heterogeneity, also satisfies UPR condition since ≤ implies that ≤ for every i ≠ j ≠ k. The Payoffs The payoffs of an agent depends on three factors: (i) the value of information that arrives to him, (ii) the cost of link formation that he has to pay, and (iii) the properties of the payoff functions whose value depends on these two variables. Based upon Table 1 , here we introduce only the payoffs as in De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and Charoensook (2015) since these two generalize other models in Table 1 .
For De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015), each agent possesses a piece of information whose value in absence of decay, is 1. i is assumed to also benefit from his own information. Define ( ) = { ∈ | chain between and exist} ∪ { } as the set of agents from whom i receive information. If information of i reaches j, the decayed information value that j receive is therefore , , where (recall that) , is the shortest distance between i and j. We assume, following the literature, that , = 0 so that , = 1. Naturally the total amount of information that i receives in the network is ( ) = ∑ ∈ ( ) , . Then, the communicational benefit that i receives in the network is ( ) = ( ( )), where (⋅) is such that ′ (⋅) > 0. It is worthmentiong that this communicational benefit function in De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) generalizes that of Bala and Goyal (2000) , since ( ) = ( ) in Bala and Goyal (2000) . The payoff in De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) is thus:
For Charoensook (2015) , the payoff is:
where (⋅, ⋅) is such that ∶ ℛ 2 → ℛ + and (⋅, ⋅) is strictly increasing in the first element and strictly decreasing in the second element.
We remark that the payoffs of Charoensook (2015) as well as Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) slightly differ from those of Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) and Bala and Goyal (2000) that assume agent heterogeneity and agent homogeneity respectively in the sense that the total information of i, ∑ ∈ ( )\{ } , , does not include the value of information of his own. At first sight, this may raise the question of whether it can be said that the model of Charoensook (2015) generalizes other existing models listed in Table 1 . We defend against this question by justifying that the inclusion/exclusion of i's own information in the payoff does not matter in the sense that the identity of agent that i prefers to establish a link with the most does not change, since this depends on the link formation cost that i has to bear alone. Nash Networks and Strict Nash Networks Consider a network g. Let − be the set of all links in g that i does not establish. That is, − = \ . Put differently, a union of − and is exactly the network g. A strategy is a best response of i to − if ( ∪ − ) ≥ ( ′ ∪ − ) for all ′ ∈ , where is the strategy set of i. A network g is a Nash network if is a best response to − for every agent i ∈ N. Moreover, if the inequality is strict for all i ∈ N , Nash network is a Strict Nash Network.
Partner Preference: Definitions
In this subsection, we provide the definition of partner preference of an agent. Our definition envisages that an agent has in mind regarding which agent, among other agents, is preferred as a potential partner with whom he wishes to form a link.
Definition 1 (partner preference).
Let ∈ (). Consider two agents x and y. A player i is said to prefer x to y or ≿ if:
1. x and y are contained in the same viewpoint of i. That is, , ∈ ( ( −)).
( ( −) ⊕ ( −)) ≥ ( ( −) ⊕ ( −))
Moreover, if the inequality above is strict, i is said to strictly prefer x to y or ≻ .
Intuitively, in a minimal network whenever a link of i ,̄= 1, is removed i is disconnected from a group of agents whose information arrives to j before finally reaching i. Our definition of partner preference simply asks 'if we pick up any two agents x and y from this group of agents and suppose that i wishes to establish a link to either x or y, which agent would yield a higher payoff to i?' This intuition is reflected in the condition (ii) of this definition, where the viewpoint of i is jointed with the reverse viewpoint of i with the link = 1 and = 1 on the left-hand side and right-hand side of the inequality respectively. Observe further that this inequality compares the payoff of i from establishing = 1 against the payoff of i from establishing = 1. Observe further that our definition does not require that i has a necessity to establish a link at all. This stems from the fact that according to our definitions viewpoint and anti-viewpoint are constructed by removing a link of i, whether i establishes the link does not matter. Another important point is that this definition of partner preference is network-based in the sense that an agent i knows whether he prefers agent x to y as a partner only if the structure of network in which all three agents i, x and y reside is given.
Based upon this definition, we further define another related term below.
Definition 2 (most preferred partner).

An agent x is said to be a most preferred partner of agent i if ≿ for every agent y that is contained in the viewpoint of i that also contains x.
Remark 1.
If a minimal network is a Strict Nash network, then every agent x with whom i establishes a link is his most preferred partner. However, an agent y who establishes a link with i does not necessarily need to be a most preferred partner of i.
The Partially Consistent Partner Preference Condition: Definition
In this subsection, we use the definition of the term partner preference to introduce a condition that a minimal network as well as a two-way flow model may satisfy. This condition requires that specific pairs of agents in a minimal network agree on their preference relation over some agent.
Definition 3.
A minimal network satisfies PCPP if for every k-agent chain whose sequence of agents is enumerated as 1 , 2 , ..., −1 , with ≥ 4 in this network, either of the following two properties with respect to partner preference holds true:
Moreover, we say that a two-way flow model satisfies this PCPP condition if every minimal network resulted from this model satisfies the PCPP condition.
That is, for any pair of agents 1 and who retrieve information of each other via a chain 1 , 2 , .., −1 , where ≥ 4 PCPP requires that ( 1 ) agrees with the preference of 1 ( ) towards 2 and −1 whenever 1 prefers 2 to −1 ( prefers −1 to 2 ).
At this point we elaborate on why we call our condition 'partially' consistent partner preference. First, our PCPP that does not impose any restriction on the preferences of 1 and towards any other agents except 2 and −1 . Second, our PCPP condition does not impose that 1 and always agree on their preferences towards 2 and −1 . Specifically 1 and agree on their preferences only if either 2 ≿ 1 −1 or −1 ≿ 2 . Indeed, it does allow for 2 ≿ −1 but −1 ≿ 1 2 . Example 1 below illustrates this point. 7
Example 1. Figure 3 . Let the payoff be linear. Let V = 1, c = 0.5, σ = 0.99 
Consider the network as in
Useful Lemmata
In this section, we establish two lemmata that allow us to conclude that all existing models listed in Table 1 satisfy PCPP condition. To do so we only need to state that the models of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and Charoensook (2015) satisfy PCPP condition, since these two models altogether generalize the other models listed in Table 1 . These are referred to as Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 below. Then in Lemma 3 we establish a lemma that allows us to describe branching network and network through an equivalent statement. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Lemma 1.
The model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) -which assumes small information decay, no heterogeneity in link formation cost, and payoff as described in Equation 1 of this paper -satisfies the PCPP condition. □
Lemma 2. The model of Charoensook (2015) -which assumes no information decay but heterogeneity in link formation cost where = { , ∶ , ∈ , ≠ } satisfies the Uniform Partner Ranking condition, and payoffs as in eq. (2) -satisfies PCPP condition. □
Next, we establish a lemma that describes branching and minimal network in a different way. Specifically it states that a minimal network is either or branching if and only if there is no inward pointing chain with more than three agents, where the definition of inward-pointing chain is given below.
Definition 4 (inward-pointing chain).
Consider an n-link chain 1 , 2 , ...., −1 , where ≥ 3. This chain is said to be an inward-pointing chain if 1 establishes a link with 2 and establishes a link with −1 . Naturally, if n = 3, we know that 2 = −1 so that 1 and access the same agent. Moreover, if n > 3, we know that 1 ≠ −1 so that 1 and access different agents.
Lemma 3.
A
minimally connected network is either a branching or B i network if and only if there exists no inward-pointing chain with more than three agents in this network. 8 □
Main Result: Partially Consistent Partner Preference Condition as a Sufficient Condition
In this section, Proposition 1 states that PCPP condition is a sufficient condition for every non-empty component of minimal SNN to be either or branching network. Then, as a corollary of this proposition we conclude that all existing models listed in Table 1 have this unique feature of SNN because all of them satisfy PCPP condition. Finally we also establish a necessary and sufficient condition for this feature of SNN as Proposition 2.
Proposition 1.
If a two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition, then every non-empty component of minimal SNN is either B i or branching.
While the formal proof is relegated to the appendix, we elaborate on the intuition behind it as follows. Recall that PCPP condition requires that ′ ≿ ′ → ′ ≿ ′ or ′ ≿ ′ → ′ ≿ ′ . PCPP therefore prohibits that ′ ≻ ′ ∧ ′ ≻ ′ , which in turn rules out that unique best responses of i and j are to access i' and j' -where j' ≠ i' -respectively. As a result, once a model satisfies PCPP then a non-empty component of minimal SNN cannot contain an inward-pointing chain. By Lemma 3 we know that this is an equivalent statement that every non-empty component of minimal SNN is either or branching. 9 Functionally speaking, the combination of Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 are quite useful. It tells us that by asking ourselves whether we can, someway somehow, in a minimally connected network or a minimal nonempty component construct a chain 1 , 2 , ..., −1 , such that 1 would preferably choose 2 over −1 -2 ≠ −1 -as a partner while would preferably choose −1 over 2 as a partner, then if the answer is no, then by Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 we know immediately that every non-empty minimal component of SNN has to belong to the classes of and branching networks. This is regardless to the specifications of two-way flow model. It does not matter, for example, whether information decay is present and what form of decay is assumed, or whether the heterogeneity is assumed in terms of information value or link formation cost, or what kind of payoff is assumed. So long as the answer to this question is no, we can at least partially characterize the shapes of SNNs. This should be useful for other researchers who wish to contribute to the literature of two-way flow models in the future.
Corollary 1.
The results De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015, Proposition 1), Bala and Goyal (2000, Proposition 5.4 
), Charoensook (2015, Proposition 1), Billand et al. (2011, Proposition 1), Galeotti et al. (2006, Proposition 1), Bala and Goyal (2000, Proposition 4.2) are such that every non-empty component of SNN is either or branching because all these two-way flow models satisfy Partially Consistent Partner Preference condition.
In the Discussion section, we show that PCPP is a sufficient but not necessary condition that guarantees that every non-empty component of SNN is either branching or minimal . A natural question that follows is what a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees likewise is. We answer this question below.
Proposition 2.
Enumerate the sequence of agents in a chain as 1 , 2 , ...., −1 , . The proof of this proposition is trivial and hence omitted. Intuitively, though, this proposition is a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the non-existence of an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents in an SNN, which as a consequence of Lemma 3 further guarantees that every non-empty component of a network is either branching or minimal . This is why this proposition requires that once 1 forms a link with 2 , then either: (i) −1 is not the most preferred partner of so that forming a link with −1 is not 's best response and hence the chain is not inward pointing, or (ii) −1 is the most preferred partner of and −1 forms a link with for the same reason.
Every non-empty component of a minimal SNN is either or branching if and only if every n-link chain with n > 3 in this SNN is such that whenever
Discussion: Intuitions from PCPP Condition
Discussion 1: New Extensions of Existing Models That Also Satisfy PCPP Condition
This section introduces some extensions of models in existing studies that also satisfy the PCPP condition introduced in this paper. Consequently it illustrates the usefulness of this condition in predicting the shapes of SNNs. Our first two extensions are based upon the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) , in which the assumption of agent homogeneity in information decay is replaced with agent heterogeneity. 10 Quite interestingly, these additions of agent heterogeneity into the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) still allow PCPP to hold. This result can be proven precisely through the same line of reasonings for proving that original model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) satisfies PCPP condition (c.f. Lemma 1 in this paper).
Example 2.
Based on the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) but instead of assuming that information decay is ∈ (0, 1) across all links we will assume that information decay of a link̄= 1 depends on the identity of link sender i. That is,
= . As before we assume that the degree of information decay is sufficiently small so that no agent has an incentive to establish a superfluous link. As mentioned above, this extension of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) satisfies PCPP.
Next, we introduce another interesting extension of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) where we assume heterogeneity in the value of nonrival information that each agent possesses.
Example 3.
Based on the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) but instead of assuming that = 1 for every ij ∈ N × N we assume that = . That is, every agent possesses a piece of information whose value may differ. Again, this model satisfies PCPP.
Discussion 2: PCPP Condition is a Sufficient but not Necessary Condition for a Component of Minimal SNN to be or Branching Network
We show by mean of (counter-) examples that PCPP is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a component of minimal SNN to be or branching. That is, there are some models that do not satisfy PCPP but can also result in this feature of SNN. (2015) 
Example 4.
Similar to Example 2 (decay heterogeneity) in Discussion 1, we replace the assumption of homogeneity in information decay in the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst
Example 5.
As a continuation of Example 3 in Discussion 1, we replace the assumption of homogeneity in information value in the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) with agent heterogeneity. However, this time we allow for a higher degree of heterogeneity, namely two-way heterogeneity, in the sense that depends on both link sender i and link receiver j, instead of one-way heterogeneity = as in Example 3. Let the 'value structure' be represented by the Table 3 Finally, it remains to be proven that this network is SNN. This can be done by tediously confirming that each agent plays his unique best response and that a superfluous link is too costly to establish. We leave this task to our readers. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we identify a generalized sufficient condition for every non-empty component of minimal twoway flow SNN to be either minimal or branching network. This condition is called Partially Consistent Partner Preference condition. We show that this PCPP condition is satisfied by several models in the existing literature whose results are such that every non-empty component of minimal two-way Strict Nash network to be either minimal or branching network. Consequently, this paper contributes to the literature by building a bridge that merges together these existing models. A question that remains, though, is what intuitions drive them to satisfy this PCPP condition and hence yield a similar characteristic of SNN. This section elaborates on this matter. First, we elaborate on the intuition behind the PCPP condition. PCPP condition is a restriction on preferences that certain pairs of agents have over certain pairs of agents. Thus, in this paper we take into account the fact that agents can be heterogeneous in terms of partner preference, where this heterogeneity in partner preference roots in agent heterogeneity that is specified in various forms in the literature. Specifically, PCPP requires that every pair of agent i and j connected through a chain with more than three agents agree on their preferences towards i' and j', where i' and j' are adjacent agents of i and j on this chain respectively, conditional upon either i prefers i' to j' or j prefers j' to i'. Put differently PCPP is violated only if ′ ≿ ′ ∧ ′ ≻ ′ or ′ ≿ ′ ∧ ′ ≻ ′ . Therefore, PCPP condition is a rather weak restriction on the heterogeneity in partner preference, in the sense that it does allow for the presence of agent heterogeneity in the network so long as the degree to which agents are heterogeneous are 'not extreme enough' that ′ ≿ ′ ∧ ′ ≻ ′ or ′ ≿ ′ ∧ ′ ≻ ′ -which is an equivalent statement that PCPP is violated -is ever possible.
At this point one may raise two questions:
i. Considering that the impact of heterogeneity of those models in Table 1 is 'not extreme enough' to cause PCPP to be violated, can we add even stronger form of agent heterogeneity into these models and still find that PCPP is not violated?
ii. Considering that the impact of heterogeneity of those models in Table 1 is 'not extreme enough' to cause PCPP to be violated, what form of heterogeneity would be extreme enough that is PCPP violated? In addition, if PCPP is violated would a minimal non-empty component of minimal SNN remains or branching?
The answer to the question (i) is yes, which we illustrate through Example 2 and 3 in Discussion 1 by allowing for = and = in addition to the presence of small information decay as in De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) . Note that in both cases we impose a restriction that rules out two-way heterogeneity in the sense that the imposed heterogeneity depends on either i or j but not both, which intuitively suggests why the the degree of heterogeneity in these examples are not extreme enough for PCPP to be violated. As a continuation of these examples, in Discussion 2 we remove the aforementioned restriction and allow for two-way heterogeneity in Example 4 and 5, i.e., and depend on both identity of link sender i and link receiver j. This allows us to answer question (ii), since we find that this form of heterogeneity is extreme enough that PCPP is violated. Note that in these examples we show that a minimal SNN is still either or branching. However, rather interestingly, using exactly the same specifications of assumptions and numbers we can also construct a minimal SNN that is neither or branching. We include these examples in Section 5.3, which is a part of the Appendix. In conclusion, we show that once PCPP is violated it cannot be guaranteed that a minimal SNN consists of non-empty components that are either or branching.
Thus, in a more general perspective the results of this paper suggest that the degree to which pattern of SNN can be predicted depends on how heterogeneous agents in the network are in terms of partner preferences. What remains to study, therefore, is to discover other restrictions on partner preference of agents in addition to PCPP condition in this paper that would also allow us to predict further properties and/or shapes of SNNs.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Reviewer 1 for his comments on the intuition of this paper and Reviewer 2 for his meticulous editorial comments, which help improve this paper substantially. At Keimyung Adams College, I thank my assistants -Youngjin Lee, Cho Young Ju, Jang Hyeon Bong, and Son Jae Tong -for their excellent help that substantially saved the time required for this research. In the previous years I also had several other assistants beside these four. While not being mentioned here by name, I nevertheless express my gratitude for their efforts. This research is supported by Keimyung University Bisa Grant for which the author feel thankful. 
Appendix
A Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1.
Without loss of generality consider the network ①. There is a chain 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 . We will show that if 2 ≿ 1 3 then 2 ≿ 4 3 . To do so, let us assume that 2 ≿ 1 3 . 11 This assumption necessitates that in the network ②, which is the viewpoint of 1 that contains both agents 2 and 3 , 2 is better informed than 3 , where the term 'better informed' refers to the fact that 2 has more total ex-post information than 3 does. Now let us modify the network ② by eliminating the link̄3 4 = 1, which results in the network ③. Observe that by removinḡ3 4 = 1 from the network ②, both 2 and 3 lose information from 4 . However, 3 loses more information from 4 than 2 does because 3 is closer to 4 than 2 . This fact and the fact that 2 is better informed than 3 in ② imply that 2 is also better informed than 3 in ③.
Next, let us modify the network ③ by adding the link 2 1 = 1 so that the network ③ becomes the network ④. Observe that in ④ the agent 2 is closer to 1 than 3 is. This observation together with the fact that in ③ 2 is better informed than 3 and that the network ④ is simply ④ = ③ + 1 2 lead to the conclusion that in ④ 2 is better informed than 3 . Finally, observe that ④ is nothing else but the viewpoint of 3 that contains 2 and 1 . This fact and the aforementioned fact that in ④ 2 is better informed than 3 allow us to conclude that 2 ≿ 4 3 . □
Proof of Lemma 2.
Let us consider a chain 1 , 2 , ..., −1 , . Without loss of generality let us assume that 2 ≿ 1 −1 . Consequently our goal is to show that 2 ≿ −1 . Before so doing, we remark that in the model of Charoensook (2015) and any model that assumes no information decay any agent i prefers agent x to y if and only if , ≤ , . Onwards, we use this fact to complete this proof. Now since it is assumed that 2 ≿ 1 −1 we know that 1 , 2 ≤ 1 , −1 . Due to the fact that = { , ∶ , ∈ , ≠ } satisfies UPR, 1 , 2 ≤ 1 , −1 necessitates that , 2 ≤ , −1 , which in turn necessitates that 2 ≿ 1 −1 . □
Proof of Lemma 3.
[
If a minimally connected network has no inward-pointing chain with more than three agents, then this network is either or branching]
The absence of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents results in the fact that there are three types of four-agent chain in a minimally connected network. The first type sequentially consists of links { 1 2 , 2 3 , 3 4 }. The second type sequentially consists of links { 2 1 , 2 3 , 3 4 }. The third type sequentially consists of links { 1 2 , 3 2 , 3 4 }. Note that the first and the second types are such that there is no agent who receives more than one link, while the third case is such that there is exactly one agent who receives more than one link. Onwards we split our proof into two subsections. In the first subsection, we show that the absence of the third type leads to a network that is branching. On the contrary, in the second subsection we show that the presence of the third type leads to a network.
Let us proceed to the first subsection. First, note that since the absence of the third type of four-agent chain is assumed, the network consists of chains that are of either first type or second type or both. We claim that in any case this network is a branching network. Assuming, without loss of generality, that a chain of the first type exists, recall that the sequence of link in this chain is { 1 2 , 2 3 , 3 4 }. 12 We first show that there is at least one agent who receives no link. Suppose not. Then it is the case that 1 receives a link from another agent 1 , who receives a link from another agent 2 . This analogy repeats infinitely, causing the network to consist of an infinite number of agents. A contradiction. Hence, there is at least one agent who receives no link. Next, we show that there is exactly one such agent. Let this agent be * . The fact that * receives no link necessitates that * establishes a link with all his adjacent agents. Hence, each of his adjacent agents receives exactly one link. The fact that each of these neighbors receives exactly one link from * further necessitates that he establishes links with all his adjacent agents who are not * . Thus, beside * every other agent receives exactly one link and establishes at least one link unless he is a terminal agent. We conclude, therefore, that this network is a branching network. Next, we proceed to the second subsection, which is to show that if the third type of chain -{ 1 2 , 3 2 , 3 4 } -is present then this network is a network. Indeed, we can show that this network is 2 network. To do so we let j be an agent who is a adjacent agent of one of these four agents -1 , 2 , 3 and 4 . Clearly j receives a link from one of these four agents. Otherwise, it is straightforward to show that an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exist. For example if j is a adjacent agent of 1 and j establishes a link with 1 , then the chain 1 , 1 2 , 3 2 is inward pointing. Similarly, any adjacent agent of j that is not one of these four agents also receives a link from j. By repeating this analogy, we have a path from any adjacent agent of 2 to a terminal agent in this network. Put differently, any agent in this network can be reached through a path from an agent that is an adjacent agent of 2 . It follows that a subset of the set of all adjacent agents of 2 forms a contrabasis of this network. Finally, observe that since there is a path from any adjacent agent of 2 to a terminal agent in this network, 2 is the only agents who receives more than one link and every other agent receives exactly one link. We conclude, therefore, that this network is 2 network.
If a minimally connected network is either a branching or network, there exists no inward-pointing chain in this component.
To do so, we prove that if there exists an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents in a minimally connected network, then the network is neither a branching or network. We divide our proof into two steps: (i) if an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exists, then the network has at least one agent i who receives more than one link, which necessitates that the network is not a branching and (ii) this agent i is not an − point contrabasis of this network, which necessitates that the network is not a network.
Let us prove the first step: if an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents exists, then the network has at least one agent i who receives more than one link. Consider an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents. Let this chain be between i and j. Let i accesses i' and j accesses j' in this chain. Next, to prove by contradiction let us suppose that there is no agent who receives more than one link. Then since i accesses i', we know that i' also accesses his adjacent agent in this chain. By repeating this analogy we know that j' access j. A contradiction. It follows that this inward-pointing chain with more than three agents contains at least one agent who receives more than one link. Let this agent be * .
We now prove the second step: * is not an * -point contrabasis of this network. First recall from the previous paragraph that * resides in an inward-pointing chain with more than three agents, and this chain is between i and j where * ≠ , . Next, consider a chain between * and j. To prove by contradiction let us suppose that * is a point contrabasis and the network is * . The assumption that * is a point contrabasis necessitates that there is a path from a adjacent agent of * to j. Let this adjacent agent of * be k. Since a path from k to j exists, we know that k accesses one of his adjacent agents, and this agent access another agent. By repeating this analogy we know that j' accesses j. A contradiction to the assumption that j accesses j' in this inward-pointing chain. □
Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
By Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that if a two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition, no SNN has an inward-pointing chain. To prove by contradiction, let us assume that in an SNN an inward-pointing chain exists.
By the definition of inward-pointing chain with more than three agents-1 , 2 , ...., −1 , -we know that 1 accesses 2 and accesses −1 . Since in a SNN every agent chooses his best response, this further necessitates that 2 ≻ 1 −1 and −1 ≻ 1 , which is a contradiction to the presupposition that the two-way flow model satisfies PCPP condition. □
Proof of Corollary 1
In the previous section, Lemma 1 and 2 show that the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) and the model of Charoensook (2015) satisfy the PCPP. Note that Proposition 1 of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) generalizes Proposition 5.4 of Bala and Goyal (2000) . Note further that Proposition 1 of Charoensook (2015) generalizes Proposition 1 of Billand, Bravard, and Sarangi (2011) , Proposition 3.1 Galeotti, Goyal, and Kamphorst (2006) (Proposition 3.1) and Proposition 4.2 of Bala and Goyal (2000) because all these models have no decay and their cost structures satisfy the UPR condition, which is assumed in Charoensook (2015) . Consequently our results in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, which show that the model of Charoensook (2015) and the model of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) respectively satisfy PCPP, are general enough to conclude that these models and their propositions satisfy the PCPP condition. In turn, by Proposition 1 above we can conclude that every non-empty component of SNN in these model are either minimal or branching. □
Additional Examples
This subsection is a continuation and a complement of Discussion 2 (Section 4.2), which includes numerical examples such that minimal SNNs remain or branching although PCPP is violated. Interestingly enough, in this subsection we show that precisely the same sets of numbers and assumptions also give rise to minimal SNNs that are neither or branching. Therefore, a conclusion from this subsection and Section 4.2 is that once PCPP is violated we cannot guarantee that every non-empty component of a minimal SNN is either or branching.
Example 6.
Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 4, consider the minimally connected network thar is neither nor branching in Figure 7 
Example 7.
Using precisely the same assumptions as in Example 5 consider the minimally connected network thar is neither nor branching in Figure 8 
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